Book Review: The New Class War by Michael Lind

Am I, representative of the technocratic overclass, responsible for populism?

Why are populists on the rise, seemingly everywhere? What explains the dissatisfaction with existing political systems and the outcomes they produce? And how do we recover trust and confidence, and create a politics and society seen to make people’s lives better? Those are the questions Michael Lind sets out to answer in The New Class War. The book came out in 2020 with the US still reeling from the first Trump term, and the far right gaining ground in Europe, but the questions only seem more urgent today given subsequent political developments.

As the title suggests, Lind believes populism is best regarded as a working class revolt against institutions that increasingly marginalise and fail them. In his telling, a managerial ‘overclass’ - loosely defined, but a significant subset of university graduates that covers not just business and political elites, but also academics and at least some charity and public sector workers - has exerted domination in three domains: economics, politics and culture.

In economics, he argues globalization has led to the loss of good industrial jobs, encouraged immigration that undercuts working class wages, and exacerbated inequality. In politics, democracy has been hollowed out, with rich elites buying influence and technocrats funneling power to non-democratically accountable institutions. And culturally, cosmopolitan values have reigned supreme. Ever since the 1970s, he argues, the working class has been dislocated, disempowered and disrespected - until they understandably snapped.

In response, he calls for "democratic pluralism." The institutions of the mid-20th Century were stronger in Lind's view because they encouraged countervailing sources of power. Trades unions, political parties and churches represented working class economic, political and cultural interests and held the power of government, technocrats and business in check. Lind wants to revive these through 'guilds' (strengthening economic bargaining), 'wards' (empowering political localism), and 'congregations' (groups representing shared cultural values).

While this diagnosis is familiar, the recommendations are interesting. But several issues emerge. First, Lind's central claim that populist discontent is best understood through a class lens faces mixed evidence. While lower income voters were more likely to support Brexit, and Trump has made gains among poorer boyers, much populist support comes from apparently more affluent middle class voters.

Lind acknowledges this by working with an expansive definition of "working class" as essentially "non-college educated," including "prosperous construction contractors" while excluding "moderately paid schoolteachers." But this makes it unclear how fundamental economic shifts are to his story. It also raises the question of why we should emphasize education over other characteristics - particularly gender, which is oddly missing despite men's greater propensity to support populist causes. You can certainly tell another story about men bristling about their diminished status relative to women and their failure to adapt to a service economy that has driven populism, which again seems less sympathetic than the economic ‘stab-in-the-back’ Lind proposes.

I’ve made it sound a little melodramatic, but I do think Lind overestimates political intention and agency in the socio-economic shifts he describes. He emphasises manufacturing job losses to trade but says little about the potentially larger impact of automation. His scepticism of skill biased technological change misses the possibility that new technology inherently rewards relatively few. These changes happen outside political control - consider how TV and the internet have contributed to social dislocation.

Though Lind acknowledges populism's international nature, his analysis remains distinctly American. His concerns about money in politics and judicial activism don't translate universally. His admiration for European corporatism overlooks how countries with strong unions like Sweden and Denmark haven't been immune to right-wing populism. Even the Netherlands, whose consensual ‘polder model’ embodies Lind's vision, has seen the far-right PVV become its largest party.

There's also a paradox in Lind's portrayal of the working class - passive victims of neoliberalism who nonetheless actively supported politicians like Thatcher and Reagan. Even if we accept they were duped or mistaken, why assume they can be easily won back? This passive presentation sits uneasily with the active civic participation his democratic pluralism requires. Can new representative bodies command legitimacy, or will they be seen as corrupt and irrelevant like existing institutions?

This tension becomes particularly acute when considering the practical demands of Lind's vision. His system of guilds, wards, and congregations sounds like it would take up a lot of evenings. Yet there's little evidence that most working people are eager to take on such civic burdens. Indeed, populism so far has been more expressive than constructive: people seem more comfortable venting frustrations than rolling up their sleeves to fix things. Brexit illustrates this phenomenon perfectly - having "taken back control," there's been remarkably little idea about what to actually do with it. The risk is that Lind's new institutions would end up empowering the small subset of people with the time and enthusiasm to participate, creating yet another layer of "representatives" who lack genuine legitimacy with those they claim to speak for.

Lind is frustratingly imprecise on cultural issues beyond immigration. He neglects the capacity of working class people to embrace cultural liberalism - consider the rapid acceptance of gay marriage. If this liberalisation was positive, which ones does he oppose? We can guess at the traditionalistic and authoritarian things this agenda might include, from symbolic pushback against ‘political correctness’, to more severe criminal sanctions (death penalty?) and restriction of trans rights and freedoms - but Lind is not explicit. But how do we know these are different? But how can he be sure that other liberal ideas won’t bed with the working class eventually, too?

Declining church attendance, which has fallen precipitously among Americans - especially working class Americans - poses particular challenges for Lind. He clearly thinks this is a bad thing, representing atomisation and decline of traditional values. But he doesn’t address what is causing it - and to the extent it is individual choice, it is unclear how to turn the clock back.

It would take another post to address whether Lind’s proposals are good policies, and it would seem to miss the point to respond to them on technocratic grounds. While some, like strengthening unions have merit, restricting immigration and trade would likely bring economic costs. I’m doubtful they are up to the job of addressing the discontent he identifies. My overarching worry is that this agenda takes us to the same place as Brexit: purchasing sovereignty at the expense of lower income, leaving us less capable of addressing the material issues we were dissatisfied with, and leaving us no less politically unhappy and divided than we were before.